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1 INTRODUCTION 
A BDRA safety system is defined as an enterprise 
safety management system that performs the follow-
ing: 
 
 Extracts information from mixed data 
sources. 
 Processes it quickly to infer and present rel-
evant safety management information. 
 Combines applications to collectively pro-
vide sensible interpretation. 
 Uses online interfaces to connect the right 
people at the right time. 
 
In order to: 
 
 Provide decision support for safety and risk 
management. 
 
This definition guides the development of BDRA sys-
tems that are of use to companies that work on the GB 
railways. BDRA aims to use big data analytics tech-
niques for safety (Van Gulijk et al. 2018; Van Gulijk 
et al. 2017). 
One of the key challenges of BDRA is to store and 
process that massive amount of data and manage the 
heterogeneous knowledge from different information 
systems to obtain safety insight. A solution lies in the 
use of graph databases that are controlled by ontolo-
gies to represent a common framework of understand-
ing and integrate data. (Figueres-Esteban et al. 2016; 
Van Gulijk et al. 2016). The method explained in this 
paper opens up Big Data for safety scientists. The 
method is straightforward but powerful and does not 
rely on gifted programmers. In theory, the database is 
infinitely scalable so it is hard to predict the limita-
tions of the approach.   
 
2 DATABASES AND BIG DATA 
In the last decades, relational databases (aka SQL da-
tabases) have dominate the market of databases until 
coming up a standard way. They are structured in ta-
bles for access and have been very efficient when it 
comes to rapid and efficient access to data.  Neverthe-
less, in big data environments where huge amounts of 
information have to be stored and integrated from 
new unknown sources, relational databases become 
unwieldy (Sadalage & Fowler 2013).  
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A solution to bypass this problem is to omit the rela-
tional table by simply storing data in a system that, 
for lack of a better example, finds its analogy in an 
infinitely scalable library card catalogue (Van Gulijk 
et al. 2018). Databases that work in that way are 
called NoSQL databases.  
2.1 GRAPH DATABASES  
In a relatively novel development these NoSQL data-
bases have been enriched with a sensible visual inter-
face based on graphs. They are simply called graph 
databases. A graph database is database management 
system that store data in the form of a property graph 
(Robinson et al. 2013). Safety scientists will recog-
nise a property graph as a collection of nodes and 
links; as we often see them in our work.  
The organization of the data in graphs is extremely 
useful in terms of understanding (Figueres-Esteban, 
Van Gulijk, et al. 2015; Figueres-Esteban, Hughes, et 
al. 2015). Graph databases allow to represent differ-
ent types of data models into a common space in order 
to integrate diverse type of data (EL Rashidy et al. 
2017). This issue is a key aspect in order to implement 
ontologies that represent the knowledge of technical 
domains such as railways, risk and safety.  
3 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION IN 
RAILWAYS 
Railways are a complex systems that represent a rich 
tapestry of different types of organisational 
knowledge, created for different purposes and people 
with different expertise, skills and competences in 
many different contexts. Bringing together all the 
data that railways produce means to make sense of 
heterogeneous knowledge from different information 
systems. 
The most common technique used by computer sci-
entists to represent a common framework of under-
standing and manage the knowledge is an ontology. 
A formal, and broadly accepted, definition of an on-
tology is provided by (Gruber 1995): “An ontology is 
an explicit specification of a conceptualization.” 
There are different types of ontologies such domain 
and application ontologies depending on their speci-
ficity of the knowledge (Guarino 1997). 
In the railway domain, the FP6 European Integrail 
project (http://www.integrail.eu/) and the RailML 
community (http://www.railml.org) proved the utility 
of ontologies in the communication and integration of 
data through railway information systems (Van 
Gulijk & Figueres-Esteban 2016). 
4 ONTOLOGIES AND GRAPH DATABASES 
FOR BDRA 
Different ontology languages and frameworks have 
been developed to support the implementation of an 
ontology (Corcho et al. 2003). The challenge is that a 
single ontology should be understood by people and 
machines.  
One of the most used frameworks is showed in the 
left side of Figure 1. Different data structures repre-
sented in formats such as XML, JSON and CSV can 
be integrated through ontologies implemented in 
RDF/OWL languages. These languages support the 
application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in order to 
reason with the represented knowledge. The approach 
that this work is taking bypasses complicated ontol-
ogy languages and replaces it with a relatively 
straightforward visual interface in a graph database. 





Figure 1. Transformation of the stack of ontology languages for 
BDRA.  
 
This paper demonstrates how to use the framework 
showed in the right side of Figure.1.  
5 METHODOLOGY 
The paper describes the implementation of a railway 
domain ontology by safety experts in order to connect 
three different data sources to an event related to 
safety management.  
The current BDRA project focuses on understand-
ing SPAD risks (passing red signals) but for the ben-
efit of explaining the method we focus on part of that 
risk: the ”signal obscured” hazard. This means that 
safety records related to obscured signals and in-
stances of a signal database have to be found and 
linked to enrich the analysis of these type of events. 
The methodology has three basic steps: 
 
a) Selection of data sources and storing data in a 
graph database.  
b) Building the signal domain ontology.  
c) Implementing the signal ontology for the inte-
gration of data.  
5.1 Data sources 
This trial uses four *.csv files extracted from three in-
formation systems: three files of text records from the 
SMIS and IFCS systems of Railway Safety and 
Standard Board (RSSB) containing around 100,000 
incidents and a table of signals from the Ellipse Asset 
Management tool of Network Rail (NR) containing 
40,000 descriptions of signals.  
SMIS is a database for recording safety-related 
events that occur on the rail network in Britain (RSSB 
2017). Railway stakeholders such as NR or 
train/freight operators enter about 75,000 events per 
year such as derailments and SPADs. In this exercise, 
we are just using records related to obscured signals. 
IFCS is a database that focuses on human perfor-
mance and underlying causes of rail incidents. These 
underlying caused are classified using 10 Incident 
Factors that are breakdown by different levels of sub-
categories (Gibson et al. 2015). The table of signals is 
a sample of descriptions of signals that is part of the 
Ellipse Asset Management tool of NR. Figure 2 





Figure 2. Description of the data sources used to support data 
integration. 
5.2 Signal domain ontology 
The purpose of the signal domain ontology is to align 
data structures of the information systems with an ac-
cepted reference framework by railways. For this ex-
ercise, the reference framework for the signal domain 
has been the railway signal standard in UK (RSSB 
2015).  
The sources showed below have been used to build 
the ontology: 
 
- The Signals, handsignals, indicators and 
signs. Handbook RS/521 Issue 3 (December 
2015). 
- The data model of the SMIS+ program. 
- The schema of the table of signals. 
 
The standard RS/521 provides a classification and de-
scription of all railway signals in UK. The data model 
of the SMIS+ includes a taxonomy of railway signals 
that is aligned with other reporting systems. The data 
structure of the table of signals does not provide a sig-
nal taxonomy but it can be extracted from the field 
“Item Name”. An example of value of this field is 
“EZ220 - SIG HEAD - COLOUR LIGHT – LED”. 
Note that programmers don’t have the expertise for 
this exercise, even if they are gifted. The interpreta-
tion and consideration of safety-aspects lies within 
the remit of safety experts.   
5.3 Implementation of the ontology and data 
integration  
The data from the information systems were stored in 
a Neo4j graph database. Each row of the data files 
represents a node in the graph database and each node 
has as many properties as columns the data file has. 
In this first step, the database has no structure and it 
just stores data under a label (data nodes). 
In the same database, the signal domain ontology 
was implemented in a graph data model (ontology 
nodes). Using the properties of the ontology nodes 
and analysing the property of the data nodes that 
stores the text of the record, the links between each 
node were created.  
The signal obscure event (event node) was con-
nected to data nodes of signals and these ones were 
connected to the data nodes of SMIS/IFCS records. 
6 RESULTS 
Table 1 shows an excerpt of the extracted ontology 
from the table of signals. This ontology was mapped 
with the explicit ontologies of the standard RS/521 
and the SMIS data model. Table 2 shows an excerpt 
of the mapping table. Figure 3 shows a piece of the 
final signal ontology.  
 
 
Table 1. Excerpt of the signal taxonomy from the ta-
ble of signals.  
Item name 
First token Second token Third token Fourth token 
EZ220 SIG HEAD COLOUR 
LIGHT 
LED 
EZ101 1 ASPECT 
EZ102 2 ASPECT 
EZ103 3 ASPECT 
EZ104 4 ASPECT 
 
Table 2. Excerpt of the mapping between the signal 
taxonomies of the RS/521 standard, SMIS and the ta-
ble of signals.  
RS/521 SMIS Table of signals 
SPAD indicator SPAD indicator ES100 
Limit of shunt signal Limit of shunt EZ160  




Figure 3. Excerpt of the UML diagram that represents the 




Figure 4 shows an excerpt of the graph database that 
contains part of the implementation of the signal on-
tology and instances of signal and SMIS/ IFCS rec-
ords. The ontology is connected to the signal nodes 
that are connected to the SMIS/IFCS records and the 





Figure 4. Excerpt of the graph database that integrates different 
types of instances of data with the event “Signal obscured” by 
means of the signal domain ontology. 
7 DISCUSSION 
This paper shows that NoSQL graph databases guided 
by ontologies enable safety scientists to work with big 
data techniques without the intervention of IT ex-
perts. Some programming is required but most of it is 
not much more complicated than excel macros or 
Matlab. The expertise of safety experts, however, is 
fundamentally required to build safety and railway 
domain ontologies to support the integration of data 
for further safety analysis.   
This work demonstrates that graph databases can 
store complex data structures as single nodes, which 
helps safety scientists navigate through their data. 
Figure 4 displays different nodes that represent data 
from signals and SMIS/IFCS records regardless of the 
internal structure of the data source.  
Domain ontologies can be straightforwardly imple-
mented in the database as a data model to integrate 
data. These ontologies support the analysis of data 
nodes that use different semantics about a railway do-
main. This semantic alignment allows to interconnect 
data nodes each other or connect them to specific 
events related to safety management. However, ontol-
ogies are far from being populated automatically and 
require safety expertise and human effort to build 
them (Figueres-Esteban & Van Gulijk 2016). Table 1 
and Table 2 shows the results of this effort in order to 
align three different data sources with a railway 
standard in a single ontology that represent the signal 
domain (Figure 3).  
Data nodes from 






The alignment of different types of data with a do-
main ontology and events related to safety has im-
portant benefits. Firstly, the ontology provides frame-
work in order to query signals. In this case, the 
standard RS/521 was selected as reference frame-
work. Secondly, the integration of data allows to con-
nect all the information available in the data sources. 
For example, linking data nodes of signals to the sig-
nal obscure event and SMIS/IFCS records allows to 
filter records by specific types of signals in order to 
improve the safety understanding related to obscured 
signals.  
8 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrates how safety scientists can en-
ter the realm of big data. It demonstrates that the chal-
lenge of storing large amounts of data from diverse 
railway data sources to extract safety learning re-
quires safety experts that can work with graph data-
bases.  
Graph databases allow to store data regardless of 
the structure of the data. But more fundamentally, it 
allows the co-location of domain ontologies to inte-
grate different data sources and extract safety learn-
ing.  
In theory, the database is infinitely scalable so it is 
hard to predict the limitations of the approach.  
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